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Abstract
Although there has been a relative abundance of scholarship exploring the contours of the
law of cyber war, far less attention has been paid to defining a law of cyber peace applicable below
the armed attack threshold. Among the most important unanswered questions is what exactly
nations’ due diligence obligations are to one another and to their respective private sectors. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not yet explicitly considered this topic, though it has
ruled in the Corfu Channel case that one country’s territory should not be “used for acts that
unlawfully harm other States.” But what steps exactly do nations and companies under their
jurisdiction have to take under international law to secure their networks, and what of the rights
and responsibilities of transit States? This Article reviews the arguments surrounding the creation
of a cybersecurity due diligence norm and argues for a proactive regime that takes into account the
common but differentiated responsibilities of public and private sector actors in cyberspace. The
analogy is drawn to cybersecurity due diligence in the private sector and the experience of the 2014
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework to help guide and broaden
the discussion.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Rarely does a day go by in which some variety of cyber attack is not frontpage news. From Sony to JP Morgan, Saudi Aramco to the Ukraine crisis,
cybersecurity is increasingly taking center stage in diverse arenas of geopolitics,
international economics, security, and law. In mid-2015 alone numerous highprofile incidents came to light involving both the public and private sectors,
including the breach of more than twenty-one million current and former federal
employees’ private information from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.1
Yet despite the increasing proliferation of these incidents, the field of international
cybersecurity law and policy remains relatively immature. For example, although
there has been a relative abundance of scholarship exploring the contours of the
law of cyber war, far less attention has been paid to defining a law of cyber peace
applicable below the armed attack threshold at which point the law of armed
conflict is activated.2 This is surprising, since the vast majority of cyber attacks do
not cross this threshold.3 Among the most important unanswered questions is
what exactly nations’ due diligence obligations to secure their networks and to
prosecute or extradite cyber attackers are. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has some guiding jurisprudence on this point. The Corfu Channel case stated that
one country’s territory should not be “used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States.”4 But analogizing is required, and these cases are not dispositive, requiring
a review of stakeholder practice. A wealth of information is available in the arena
of cybersecurity due diligence from both the public and private sectors, that has,
to date, been largely untapped, that could help answer the question of what steps
nations and companies under their jurisdiction should take to secure their
networks.
This Article reviews the arguments surrounding the creation of a
cybersecurity due diligence norm and argues for a proactive regime that takes into
account the common but differentiated responsibilities of various stakeholders in
cyberspace. The analogy is drawn to cybersecurity due diligence in the private
sector and the experience of the 2014 National Institute of Standards and
1

2

3

4

See, for example, Bill Chappell, Federal Employee Breach Very Likely Included Security Clearance
Info, NPR (June 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/12/
414031155/federal-employee-breach-included-classified-clearance-info.
See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICATION TO CYBER
WARFARE 17 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (discussing when a cyber attack could trigger
the right of self-defense) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING
U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 34, 67 (William A. Owens
et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES].
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
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Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework) to guide and enrich the
discussion.5 Ultimately, we argue that international jurisprudence has an invaluable
role to play, but the experience of national regulators and the private sector is also
informative in this space, especially given the robust and necessary public-private
cross-pollination that occurs when clarifying and spreading cybersecurity best
practices. Yet despite the importance of due diligence, this is a topic that has
received remarkably little attention in the literature to date.6
This Article begins in Section II by reviewing the applicable ICJ
jurisprudence and literature on cybersecurity due diligence under international law.
In Section III, we turn to national case studies to help flesh out a potential
cybersecurity due diligence norm focusing on the cyber powers of the United
States, Germany, and China. In addition, we review lessons from the privatesector cybersecurity due diligence context, focusing on mergers and acquisitions
and supply chain management, to better understand contemporary risk mitigation
realities. Finally, we conclude with some implications for managers and
policymakers.

II. U NPACKING D UE D ILIGENCE U NDER
I NTERNATIONAL L AW
International law has been defined as the legal rules, norms, and standards
that apply between States and between States and non-State actors, including
international organizations and multinational companies enjoying legal
personality.7 The primary sources of international law include treaties, general
principles of law, and custom, the third of which requires evidence of State
practice that nations follow out of a sense of legal obligation, known as opinio
juris.8 The subsidiary sources of international law include judicial decisions and
5

6

7

8

See Rachel Ensign, Cybersecurity Due Diligence Key in M&A Deals, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24,
2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/24/cybersecurity-duediligence-key-in-ma-deals.
Cf. White House and Department of Defense Announce Strategies to Promote Cybersecurity, Including
Strengthening Norms Affecting Internet Security, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 794, 795 (2011)
(“Cybersecurity Due Diligence: States should recognize and act on their responsibility to
protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from damage or
misuse.”); Jody M. Prescott, Responses to Five Questions on National Security Law, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1536, 1541 (2012) (discussing the U.S. International Strategy for
Cyberspace); Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks through Polycentric
Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1354 (2013) (discussing the due diligence aspect of
the 2011 U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace).
International Law, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016).
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
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scholarly writing.9 Given the recent nature and rapid development of cybercapabilities, there are comparatively few treaties that specifically address the rights
and obligations of States vis-a-vis these cyber-capabilities, with the notable
exception of the Budapest Convention discussed below.10 Absent a robust treaty
regime and given the geopolitical difficulties of negotiating new agreements in this
area, it is vital to clarify the role of customary international law as it relates to due
diligence.

A. An
Introduction
Cybersecurity Law

to

Customary

International

One precedent informing customary international cybersecurity law was
articulated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States case (Nicaragua), which
involved a dispute over the United States’ involvement with the Contra rebellion
in Nicaragua.11 In Nicaragua, the ICJ held that customary international obligations
would arise from the consistent, widespread practice of States engaging in specific
acts or omissions, performed out of a sense of obligation that such acts or
omissions were required by international law (opinio juris).12 The combination of
opinio juris and State practice performed by a significant number of States and
without the express disavowal of a significant number of other States, gives rise
to international obligations under customary international law.13 The underlying
rationale is that this combination reflects a consensus in the international
community that the actions taken represent an international obligation.
Despite Nicaragua’s clear articulation of the rule, in practice, the development
of customary international law presents a temporal dilemma. For a State to engage
in actions out of a sense of legal duty, this decision presupposes the existence of
such a duty, and therefore the prior existence of customary international law on a
certain issue.14 To help resolve this dilemma, Professor Frederic Kirgis argued for
what he calls a “sliding scale” approach.15 Professor Kirgis argues State practice
and opinio juris need to be understood on a spectrum, wherein the requirement
for opinio juris increases as the evidence of State practice decreases. Rather than
9
10
11

12
13
14

15

Id.; see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 68–72 (4th ed. 1997).
Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27)[hereinafter Nicaragua].
See id. at ¶¶ 183–86.
Id.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Chronological Paradox, State Preferences, and Opinio Juris, DUKE L., 4,
(June 1, 2013), https://law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/opiniojuris/panel_1-bradley-the_
chronological_paradox,_state_preferences,_and_opinio_juris.pdf.
Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 (1987).
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impose strict requirements for both State practice and opinio juris, the sliding scale
approach argues that a strong history of State practice can give rise to international
obligations absent opinio juris.16 Likewise, compelling opinio juris could give rise
to international obligations with little evidence of State practice.17 The sliding scale
approach may prove particularly important in the cybersecurity realm as these
novel technologies have developed too rapidly for evidence of widespread State
practice to emerge, yet compelling opinio juris may still form the basis for
international obligations.
Proving opinio juris, however, is a difficult task, especially in the cyber
context. The temporal dilemma makes pointing to existing rules challenging, so
the preferred method is to identify broad principles that enjoy widespread
international agreement, which the ICJ suggests may be evidenced by treaties.18
Indeed, most courts rely on treaties to identify opinio juris, often exclusively so.19
Yet in the cyber realm, treaties have largely focused on implementing domestic
cybercrime laws and have done relatively little to address cybersecurity standards,
leaving such decisions to the private sector and standards bodies such as the NIST
Framework, discussed below.20
So using cybercrime as an example, international agreements like the
Budapest Convention, the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data
Protection, and the various Association of Southeast Asian Nations working
groups on cybercrime all could serve as opinio juris that States have an obligation
to enact and enforce cybercrime laws within their territories and to cooperate to
prosecute and extradite cybercriminals. Even though these agreements often lack
binding language, they nonetheless suggest a growing international consensus that
the establishment of domestic cybercrime laws is an international obligation.21
Similarly, the Organization of American States has also encouraged Member
States to join the Budapest Convention and to increase regional cooperation to
mitigate cybercrime, whereas a nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolution
calls on States to “eliminate safe havens” for cybercriminals.22 Declarations like
16
17
18

19
20
21

22

See id.
See id.
Mitu Gulati, How Do Courts Find International Custom? (May 30, 2013)(unpublished
manuscript)(on file with Duke Law Journal), http://law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/opiniojuris/
panel_6-gulati-how_do_courts_find_international_custom.pdf.
See id.
See infra Section III.B.
For an extended discussion of these and other applicable treaty regimes, see SCOTT J.
SHACKELFORD, An Introduction to the Law of Cyber War and Peace, in MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER
PEACE 263 (2014).
G.A. Res 5563,¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. ARES5563 (Jan. 22, 2001).
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these, although non-binding, serve as further evidence of international consensus
regarding cybercrime. While it is unlikely that a non-signatory State would be
bound to the specific terms of a treaty to which it did not sign—particularly in the
short term—that treaty may still serve to identify broad principles that form
opinio juris and thereby can build a foundation for international obligations.
The search for cybersecurity opinio juris is further complicated by the
multifaceted cyber threat comprising cybercrime, espionage, terrorism, and war.
While the classification of State cyber-activities is a well-known problem,23 the fact
that these activities are so widespread suggests a lack of opinio juris against
aggressive State cyber-activity below the armed-attack threshold. The ambiguity
surrounding State cyber-activities is further reinforced by discussions of the
international law relating to espionage, which is largely unregulated outside the
law of war context.24 Similarly, domestic cybersecurity practices are highly variable
and can involve the surreptitious installation of malware—as alleged of Chinese
telecommunications providers and the National Security Agency (NSA) alike—
discussed further below.25 Given the relative lack of multilateral progress, claiming
a widespread consensus for an underlying cybersecurity norm is challenging: a
situation that can only be marginally mitigated by investigating related ICJ
jurisprudence on the subject.

B. ICJ Jurisprudence
Due Diligence

as

It

Relates

to

Cybersecurity

Although the ICJ has never directly addressed cybersecurity due diligence
requirements, its cases discussing due diligence generally can serve as broad
guideposts to infer cyber-specific applications. It is worth noting that these cases
all arose prior to the proliferation of cyber attacks, but some of the principles that
underlay the cases, including Corfu Channel, Trail Smelter, and Nicaragua, may still
have some applicability.26 Before reviewing these cases though, it is first important
to define “cybersecurity due diligence.” In the transactional context, this term has
23

24

25

26

For more on this topic, see SHACKELFORD, Defining the Cyber Threat in Internet Governance, in
MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN
SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 3, supra note 21.
See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 595, 601–602 (2007).
See Wolfgang Gruener, Many New PCs in China Come With Malware Preinstalled, TOM’S
HARDWARE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/microsoft-pcwindows-security-china,17758.html.
However, it should be noted that other jurisprudence is also on point and is not discussed
here due to space constraints, including: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8); Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 193 (Apr. 20).

Summer 2016

7

Chicago Journal of International Law

been defined as “‘the review of the governance, processes and controls that are
used to secure information assets.’”27 The concept as it is used in this Article builds
from this definition and may be understood as the customary national and
international obligations of both State and non-State actors to help identify and
instill cybersecurity best practices and effective governance mechanisms so as to
promote cyber peace through enhancing the security of computers, networks, and
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructure.
Cybersecurity due diligence obligations may exist between States, between nonState actors (for example, private corporations, end-users), and between State and
non-State actors. Applicable instruments include technical standards, legal
requirements born from treaty or custom, as well as national policies and privatesector industry norms, discussed below.28
We will proceed by highlighting three international obligations identified by
the ICJ: the duty to warn, the “no harm” principle, and non-intervention, which
we will use to infer cyber-specific applications and identify potential problems.
We will then go on to address the law governing countermeasures for when an
international obligation is violated, address its applicability to cyber-operations,
and consider the implications for cyber due diligence.

1. Corfu Channel and the duty to warn.
One of the earliest ICJ cases on the issue of international due diligence
standards is the 1947 resolution of the Corfu Channel dispute.29 In this instance,
two British warships struck mines and were sunk in the Corfu Channel, an
international strait located in Albanian territorial waters. The British brought the
case before the ICJ, which focused primarily on the right of innocent passage and
on the duty of the Albanian government to warn the British of the mines’
existence. Although the Court did not find evidence that the Albanian government
placed the mines itself, it did conclude the Albanian government should have
known of the mines’ existence, and therefore had a duty to warn the British
warships. The ICJ based its decision on “certain general and well-recognized
principles,” specifically “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”30
This obligation, although articulated in the context of domestic waterways,
carries over into the cybersecurity realm. The most direct cyber-parallel would be
27

28
29
30

Tim Ryan, Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-Transaction Assessments Can Uncover Costly Risks, KROLL
CALL (Jan. 28, 2015), http://blog.kroll.com/2015/cyber-due-diligence-pre-transactionassessments-can-uncover-costly-risks/.
See infra Section III.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
Id. at 22.
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a duty between States for the host State to warn other States operating within the
host State’s domestic networks of vulnerabilities known to exist on those
networks, but this might extend more generally to a duty to warn other States of
vulnerabilities detected in that other State’s or a third State’s networks.31 While
this principle is unlikely to require the warning State to identify vulnerabilities with
particularity, it could require a State to warn other States of the existence of the
equivalent of “cyber mines” (such as logic bombs).32 The underlying principle of
these duties, drawn from Corfu Channel, is that States have a duty to warn other
States of known or foreseeable harms, particularly when those harms arise from
within the warning State’s sovereign territory. However, whether such duties
could effectively coexist with the current international standards regarding
espionage, discussed above, and the exceptions for national security, discussed
below, is not yet apparent.33 Nor is it obvious how this reasoning will apply to the
increasing use of cloud-based computing by companies and governments and the
related jurisdictional issues that such use entails.34
Importantly, Corfu Channel articulated different standards of proof for direct
State actions and omissions, the latter of which would govern the duty to warn.
The standard required to prove a State action was not specifically stated, although
the ICJ noted that it required “a degree of certainty that has not been reached
here,” whereas to prove an omission required “no room for reasonable doubt.”35
Some commentators have noted that the language used for omissions appears to
reflect a higher standard than that for direct actions.36 Nonetheless, omissions are
likely to be easier to prove in practice, as the ICJ is more willing to accept
circumstantial evidence in these instances, particularly when the opposing party
controls the direct evidence.37 Consequently, in Corfu Channel, although the British
31

32

33
34

35
36

37

See Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules for Cyber Security, 53 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POLITICS AND
STRATEGY 119 (2011).
Logic bombs often appear as malware and are designed to set off a malicious function
when certain conditions are met – such as a specific time and date. The full extent of logic
bomb infiltration on existing networks is unknown, but there have been logic bombs
implanted in U.S. critical national infrastructure. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K.
KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 92 (2010).
See supra Section II.A; infra Section II.D.
See, for example, Cloudy Jurisdiction: Addressing the Thirst for Cloud Data in Domestic Legal
Processes, EFF, https://www.eff.org/document/cloudy-jurisdiction-addressing-thirstcloud-data-domestic-legal-processes.
Corfu, supra note 4, at 17–18.
Katherine Del Mar, The International Court of Justice and Standards of Proof, in THE ICJ AND
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ENDURING IMPACT OF THE CORFU
CHANNEL CASE 98, 107 (Karine Bannelier et al. eds., 2012).
Corfu, supra note 29, at 18.
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government failed to meet the standard of proof that the Albanian government
had placed the mines, it nonetheless was able to satisfy the evidentiary burden to
prove the Albanian government would have known of the mines’ existence, and
therefore entailed the duty to warn. This issue is relevant to cyber attacks since
even though a given exploit may be launched from within a State’s territorial
boundaries, attributing it back to that State’s government is no easy feat.38
The attribution problem may become less burdensome, however, when
attempting to prove the State’s knowledge of attacks within its territory given Corfu
Channel’s allowance for “more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and
circumstantial evidence” when the evidence is controlled by the opposing State.39
Although the mere fact that the activity occurred in the State’s territory is not
evidence of knowledge, activities such as the use of the State’s non-commercial
critical infrastructure may serve as a rebuttable presumption that the State had
knowledge of the attack.40 Some commentators go even further and assert that a
strict liability regime is appropriate if that State fails to enact or enforce
appropriate cyber-legislation, citing a failure to satisfy a State’s duty to prevent
cyber-attacks within its own territory.41 Regardless of the viability of such an
expansive view of State responsibility, Corfu Channel proves the ICJ will not
absolve a State of liability for actions occurring within its territory solely due to a
lack of direct attribution to the State.

2. Trail Smelter and the “no harm” principle.
The ICJ again addressed the issue of due diligence in the Trail Smelter dispute,
which involved the emission of environmentally hazardous materials across the
U.S.–Canadian border, raising the question of what obligations States owe
neighboring States. This case represented an early conflict between the historic
system of territorial sovereignty and the newer conceptions of jurisdiction based
upon activities that have substantial effects domestically. Ultimately, Trail Smelter
held that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory . . . to
cause injury by fumes . . . to the territory of another . . . when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” 42
Although directed towards the emission of fumes, Trail Smelter has come to
38

39
40

41

42

Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and
the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F.L. REV. 167, 193–95 (2012).
Corfu, supra note 4, at 18.
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, 89 INT’L L.
STUD. 123, 137 (2013).
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the
Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12–
13 (2009).
Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RIAA 1905, 1965 (1941).

10

Vol. 17 No. 1

Cybersecurity Due Diligence

Shackelford

represent the broader “no harm” principle, which requires of States “that activities
within their jurisdiction or control respect the environment of other States.”43
This “no harm” principle, although directed towards environmental harms,
enjoys parallels with cybersecurity, and may serve as the foundation for a broader
State obligation to prohibit domestic activities that would result in “serious
consequences” internationally. Specifically, the analogy could be drawn such that
if noxious cyber-activities from one State cause serious repercussions in another,
then the offending State has a duty to mitigate the threat. Indeed, as with
environmental pollution, overuse can occur in cyberspace, such as when spam
messages consume limited bandwidth, which has been called a form of
“information pollution,” and Distributed Denial of Service attacks that can cause
targeted websites to crash through too many requests for site access.44 However,
though recognized by the ICJ, this precedent does not enjoy significant State
practice, since recognizing it would likely mean litigation surrounding a potentially
vast array of transboundary pollution; a laudable goal to be sure, but an
impracticable one for the foreseeable future. Yet Trail Smelter’s reference to cases
of “serious consequence” ultimately suggests that State practice may exist in
maintaining noxious domestic activity below a certain threshold of permissibility,
albeit a high one, and therefore could support a broader no harm principle in
customary international law applicable to cyber attacks.45

3. Nicaragua and non-intervention.
Perhaps the least clear, yet potentially most far-reaching precedent informing
an international cybersecurity due diligence obligation from the ICJ is Nicaragua,
which recognized the principle of non-intervention and the importance of State
sovereignty. In deciding against the United States in that case, the ICJ articulated
the obligation of States not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other States if

43

44

45

Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 447, 457
(Erkki Hollo et al. eds., 2012).
Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The Need for Individual
Accountability on Tomorrow’s Battlefield, 3 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, ¶ 4, (2010); Roger
Hurwitz, The Prospects for Regulating Cyberspace: A Schematic Analysis on the Basis of Elinor
Ostrom, “General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social Ecological Systems,” 325 SCI.
419 (2009).
However, a counterargument to this train of logic is that, given the difficulties of
attributing and controlling international harms emanating from Internet infrastructure,
the no harm principle could be stretched to the breaking point in the cybersecurity
context. Such an argument ultimately turns on the technological and governance
cybersecurity capabilities of the States in question. For a rundown of States with regards
to their “cyber power,” see BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER POWER INDEX 2–6 (2014)
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Cyber_Power_Index_Findings_and_Methodol
ogy.pdf [hereinafter CYBER POWER INDEX].
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that intervention related to “the choice of a political, economic, social, and cultural
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”46 Although non-intervention is in
tension with the more expansive effects jurisdiction in Trail Smelter, this tension
reflects an important debate in the cybersecurity context, with some States
asserting varying degrees of national sovereignty over their domestic intranets
even as others espouse the virtues of a “global networked commons.”47 Indeed,
several dozen nations now routinely filter traffic, which some say is threatening
the dawn of a new age of Internet sovereignty.48 How multi-stakeholder Internet
governance will coalesce with classic conceptions of State sovereignty over the
long run remains unclear, but the potential for domestic cyber policies to have
international ramifications has never been greater:49 a fact that may entail
obligations on the cyber powers in particular, some of which are discussed
below.50
Yet exactly what “cyber non-intervention” entails is unclear. Apart from
cyber-operations that amount to a “use of force”51 or which pass the armed attack
threshold triggering the law of armed conflict,52 there is a wide range of cyberactivity that may impact State sovereignty. And there is no clear delineation of
what behavior is internationally acceptable. The Tallinn Manual, although directed
towards the application of the law of armed conflict to cyber-operations,
recognizes that a cyber-operation that falls below a “use of force” can still qualify
as an “intervention.”53 An example of this category of cyber-intervention is likely
46
47

48

49

50
51
52
53

Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶ 205.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Jan.
21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
See James A. Lewis, Why Privacy and Cyber Security Clash, in AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 123, 126 (Kristin M. Lord and
Travis Sharp eds., 2011).
See, for example, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001) rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) on reh'g en banc,
433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) and rev'd and remanded, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); JACK
GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD 5 (2006).
See infra Section III.A.
See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 42–44.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 44. The UN Charter generally divides conflict into three zones. The first threshold
is defined by Article 2(4), which makes the threat or use of force illegal without UN
Security Council (UNSC) authorization. There are many examples of acts that States have
not treated as breaching Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force, including trade
disputes, space-based surveillance, espionage, and economic sanctions. See Bruno Simma,
NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (1999); NATIONAL
ACADEMIES, supra note 3, at 242. But even though state practice has shown that such acts
do not activate Article 2(4) protections, it is an open question how threats of force may
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Stuxnet, a sophisticated cyber weapon designed to target Iranian nuclear
facilities.54 Classification of Stuxnet has been a contentious issue, with some
arguing it was a “use of force” and others that it constituted an “armed attack,”
but Stuxnet at a minimum met the requirements of an intervention.55
The governing principle for an intervention is that it must be “coercive”
towards activities protected by State sovereignty such as those regarding the
State’s choice of political, economic, social, or cultural system.56 While traditional
espionage is widely accepted as non-coercive in relation to these areas, there is
more debate over the coerciveness of economic espionage. Since economic
espionage involves the theft of valuable trade secrets and intellectual property,
now made far easier through the use of cyber technologies,57 some commentators
suggest that economic espionage impacts the economy of the victim State so
much that it amounts to coercive activity with regard to economic matters, and
therefore should be classified as an intervention under international law.58

54

55

56
57

58

be regulated in cyberspace; for example, “[d]oes introducing vulnerabilities into an
adversary’s system . . . constitute a threat of force . . . ?” Id. at 242, 257 (noting that
prohibited threats under Article 2(4) might include “verbal threats, initial troop
movements, initial movement of ballistic missiles, [or the] massing of troops on a
border . . . .”). The second zone includes the thresholds encompassed in Articles 39 and
42, at which point the UNSC may designate a breach to international peace and security
and take action to restore order. Id. at 242 (discussing Articles 39 and 42 as the “two
exceptions to this prohibition on the use of force.”). The final barrier is Article 51, which
allows for the “right of individual or collective self-defense” in response to an armed
attack. Id. at 243.
See ALEKSANDR MATROSOV ET AL., STUXNET UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 17 (Rev. Jan.,
31, 2011); Steven Cherry, How Stuxnet is Rewriting the Cyberterrorism Playbook, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Oct. 13, 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/telecom/security/howstuxnet-is-rewriting-the-cyberterrorism-playbook.
For further discussion as to what types of cyber interventions may be classified as armed
attacks, see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 45 (The classification of Stuxnet as an
intervention is theoretical, as Iran never formally acknowledged or condemned Stuxnet,
although some sources suggested Iran was considering such international legal action.);
see Shahrooz Shekaraubi, Iran’s Case against Stuxnet, INDIAN STRATEGIC STUD. (March 21,
2014),
http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2014/03/irans-case-against-stuxnet.
html.
Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶ 205.
Jeremy Kirk, GhostNet Cyber Espionage Probe Still has Loose Ends, PC WORLD (June 18,
2009), https://www.pcworld.com/article/166901/article.html (the “legal vacuum”
surrounding cyber espionage can be especially problematic for investigators). For more
background on cyber espionage, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 21.
See Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under
International Law, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 443, 511–12 (2015). Another example
of coercion is briefly discussed in the Tallinn Manual, which suggests that actions taken to
induce regime change may be viewed as coercive towards a State’s choice of political
system. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 45. Going further, we may use the facts in
Nicaragua to speculate that provisioning rebel groups with cyber-weapons to facilitate
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Moreover, a cyber-intervention by indirect means may also run afoul of a State’s
international obligations. For instance, the Arab Spring revolutions of the early
2010s were facilitated in part through the use of social media, particularly
Facebook and Twitter.59 These U.S. firms’ policies derived from liberal notions of
free speech and assembly, and activists used these platforms to mobilize and
organize in a manner that subverted traditional governmental mechanisms for
societal control. While certainly not as direct as the provision of arms, as in
Nicaragua, this nonetheless provided a powerful platform through which activists
were able to organize an anti-government movement. And while these events are
likely not attributable back to the U.S. government,60 the United States has
supported efforts to circumvent Internet censorship,61 ensuring access to
platforms that other States may not support.
A potentially more difficult case of a cyber-intervention is the anonymity
software Tor, a software package originally developed by the U.S. Navy to
facilitate secure and anonymous online communication, which is currently freely
available online around the globe.62 Through a process known as “onion routing,”
Tor makes attempts to monitor or censor network traffic difficult; indeed, Tor’s
efficacy has led to the NSA referring to it as “the King of high-secure, low-latency
Internet anonymity.”63 As such, Tor can facilitate the free speech of individuals
living in countries that heavily control Internet traffic, including China and its
“Great Firewall.”64 While championed by some as a victory for free speech, this
service also represents an affront to Chinese sovereignty. Though the U.S.

59

60
61

62

63

64

rebellion would reasonably be deemed an intervention, particularly if the use of those
cyber-weapons by the provisioning State would amount to a use of force.
Pierre Omidyar, Social Media: Enemy of the State or Power to the People?, HUFF. POST (Feb. 27,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pierre-omidyar/social-media-enemy-of-the_b_
4867421.html.
See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 29–36.
See, for example, James Glanz & John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around
Censors, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/
world/12internet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
About Tor, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Aug.
4, 2015).
Tor: ‘The King of High-Secure, Low-Latency Anonymity’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-high-secureinternet-anonymity. However, the technology is far from perfect leading to data breaches
that have called into question Tor’s continuing utility. See Richard Adhikari, Tor Has Been
Breached - What Now?, TECH. NEWS WORLD (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.technewsworld.
com/story/80834.html?rss=1. The rise of encrypted “https” sites is also decreasing the
need for Tor. See HTTPS Everywhere, EFF, https://www.eff.org/Https-Everywhere (last
visited Aug. 11, 2014).
A Closer Look at the Great Firewall of China, TOR BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/closer-look-great-firewall-china.
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government is not directly providing Tor to Chinese nationals, it was the U.S.
Navy that developed the software and it was U.S. policy to permit Tor to be freely
available. Given that cryptography was on the U.S. Munitions List until 1992, and
high-level encryption remains subject to export controls,65 Tor presents a closer
analogy to Nicaragua and represents how difficult the notion of non-intervention
can be in a digital environment.
Taking the broadest potential interpretation of “intervention” that is at the
heart of Nicaragua, even the Internet itself implicates State sovereignty. Professor
Lawrence Lessig warned of the powerful societal influences that network
architecture shapes as part of his famed claim that “code is law.”66 The Internet’s
architecture reinforces anonymity and free speech, which, given the phenomenal
growth of the Internet, can influence the internal affairs of foreign States.67 Akin
to the German Empire surreptitiously shuttling Vladimir Lenin into Russia to
foment revolutionary fervor during the First World War, an open Internet allows
for the infiltration of ideologies into States where those ideologies might be
considered destabilizing.68 Considering the ever-expanding importance of the
Internet to States, including to those States’ political, economic, social, and
cultural systems, this raises concerns in some quarters over the outsized role that
the U.S. currently occupies in the development of the Internet and online
services.69
Considering the State practice on intervention, however, there seems to be
a growing consensus that international obligations fall not on the offending State
to restrain any undue influence, but on the victim State to affirmatively exclude it.
In response to the pervasive use of social media by protest groups, numerous
countries either blocked Twitter, such as Iran,70 or specifically requested that
Twitter censor certain accounts and tweets within their territory, as was the case

65

66
67
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For a more in depth discussion of encryption export controls, see John R. Shane & Lori
E. Scheetz, Export Controls for Tech Companies: The Basics and the Pitfalls of U.S. Encryption
Controls, 18 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2014).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 148 (2009).
See J. Michael Daniel, Robert Holleyman & Alex Niejelow, China’s Undermining an Open
Internet, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/
02/china-cybersecurity-114875.html#.Vc3_0hRVhBc.
See Thomas Schulz, Tomorrowland: How Silicon Valley Shapes Our Future, DER SPIEGEL (Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-cover-story-howsilicon-valley-shapes-our-future-a-1021557.html.
Jason Rezaian, Facebook, Twitter Blocked Again in Iran, WASH. POST, (Sept. 17, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/09/17/facebooktwitter-blocked-again-in-iran/.

Summer 2016

15

Chicago Journal of International Law

in Egypt.71 In this way, Twitter’s code is the law, and States wishing to impose
more speech-restricting standards must ask Twitter to affirmatively censor
content within their borders, or block it entirely. Likewise, China’s response to
tools like Tor has not been to seek their removal by the U.S. government, but
rather to prevent their download and to restrict their functionality within Chinese
networks.72 These reactions suggest that a de jure (if not de facto) open Internet
may well become the international default, and that any State wishing to impose
greater restrictions is obliged to take action. This understanding of the Internet is
reflected by its architecture: code may become customary international law.
The current status of State practice may also be a reflection of the underlying
weakness of the non-intervention principle and of the further erosion of
Westphalian sovereignty—the historic system that has long underpinned
international relations—in favor of a more effects jurisdiction-based order, as seen
in Trail Smelter.73 Although nominally violative of international law, international
relations could nonetheless be characterized largely as a battle of low-level
interventions, with each State attempting to influence the policies of foreign
States. Asserting a hard rule of non-intervention can come off as somewhat
idealistic, as some degree of intervention is widely acknowledged in the
international community. Indeed, the ICJ itself recognized the apparent weakness
of the principle in Nicaragua stating that, “examples of trespass against this
principle are not infrequent.”74 In practice, non-intervention may be more of a
diplomatic sparring match, where low-level interventions are met and countered
with opposing low-level interventions. When viewed in this manner, the current
international tension surrounding cyber espionage fits well, with low-level cyberoperations justifying opposing in kind responses, as will be discussed further with
regard to countermeasures. The question then becomes: at what level does such a
low-intensity conflict rise to something more, as is currently under debate in the
Obama Administration regarding the 2015 Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) breach.75
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Twitter’s Censorship Plan Rouses Global Furor, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/twitters-censorship-plan-rouses-global-furor/.
Andrew Jacobs, China Further Tightens Grip on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/asia/china-clamps-down-still-harder-oninternet-access.html?_r=1&assetType=nyt_now.
See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20–26 (1948);
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, GOVERNING THE FROZEN COMMONS: THE ANTARCTIC
REGIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 222 (1998).
Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶ 202.
See Chappell, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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4. Countermeasures and the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project.
A victim State is empowered to take appropriate “countermeasures” in
response to a violation of customary international law.76 Countermeasures are
otherwise unlawful actions (or omissions) that are legally permitted77 when used
by a victim State in response to unlawful activity to induce the offending State to
cease the unlawful activity.78 While there is a large body of work discussing
countermeasures,79 the element attracting the most attention is “proportionality,”
which says countermeasures must be “commensurate with the injury suffered,
taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights
in question.”80 The proportionality requirement empowers States to engage in a
wide range of activities, albeit with restrictions for actions implicating international
humanitarian law, human rights, or the threat of or use of force.81 Therefore, a
State suffering a violation of international standards of due diligence may be
empowered to take appropriate countermeasures against the offending State, so
long as those countermeasures are proportional to the violation of due diligence.
Yet what constitutes a “proportional” countermeasure to a violation of due
diligence remains unclear. Although proportionality is a well-known requirement
in both the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law,
proportionality in the countermeasures context is subject to a distinct body of
law,82 and was specifically addressed in the ICJ case Hungary v. Slovakia on the
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project.83 The case involved a dispute over the
construction and operation of a dam, wherein Hungary’s failure to comply with
the terms of the project prompted Slovakia to intentionally divert the Danube, a
border river. The ICJ determined that although Hungary had violated
international law by failing to comply with the terms of the dam agreement,
Slovakia’s countermeasures were nonetheless unlawful because they were not

76
77

78

79

80
81
82

83

Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Port. V. Ger.), 2 RIAA 1011, 1025–26 (1928).
This distinguishes countermeasures from retorsions, which are “unfriendly, although
lawful” State actions. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 40.
Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response
Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 700 (2014).
See generally Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 1, G.A. Res.
56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State
Responsibility].
Id. art. 51.
Id. art. 50(1)(a)–(d).
See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 715, 738 (2008).
Gabc̆íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
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proportionate.84 Despite Hungary’s initial violation arising from treaty law, not
due diligence, Slovakia’s actions may prove useful as a point of comparison when
evaluating responses to violations of due diligence. The case potentially suggests
that active interference with essential resources (such as throttling Internet
traffic)85 may be viewed as disproportionate to more passive failures to satisfy a
State’s obligations.
Despite Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros hinging on proportionality, the ICJ did not
detail how the analysis should be structured.86 Yet this vagueness might represent
a consensus in the international community not to place too constrictive a legal
regime on States engaging in such diplomatic behavior. While Slovakia’s actions
in Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros may have been clearly outside the bounds of customary
international law, other cases adjudicating proportionality have been more lenient
with the proportionality inquiry. Arbitration between France and the United States
over an airline dispute, for example, held that the U.S.’s countermeasures,
although having a notably larger economic impact than France’s actions, were not
“clearly disproportionate,” and therefore were justified under international law.87
The adjudicating tribunal held that economically disproportionate
countermeasures can be justified when enforcing a principle,88 thus allowing for
laxity in the proportionality assessment.89
84
85

86
87
88
89

Id. at ¶ 87.
See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and
Challenges to the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and
Ideas of All Kinds Through the Internet, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, ¶¶ 49–50 (May 16,
2011).
See Franck, supra note 82, at 716.
Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 RIAA 417, ¶ 83 (1978).
Id.
Although other requirements are often invoked regarding the legality of countermeasures,
Gabc̆íkovo-Nagymaros only expressly acknowledged one: that the countermeasures must
be to induce the offending State to comply with its international obligations. See
Gabc̆íkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 83, at ¶ 87. This is sometimes reframed to
require that countermeasures not be punitive, and is generally accepted to encompass a
requirement that countermeasures, when possible, be reversible (that the
countermeasures can be undone once the offending State is in compliance with their
international obligations). See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 79, at art. 49,
commentary 9 (“States should as far as possible choose countermeasures that are
reversible.”). Moreover, although the ILC suggests that countermeasures should require
the victim State to call upon the offending State to cease the activities prior to
commencing countermeasures, even this is undermined by an exception for “urgent
countermeasures.” Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 79, at art. 52(1)–(2). In the
cyber context, this exception may trivialize the requirements for prior notification, since
many incidents are likely to be deemed urgent in an arena as dynamic and fraught with
attribution difficulties as cyber. See Katherine C. Hinkle, Countermeasures in the Cyber Context:
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Applying these principles to cyber-countermeasures suggests that States will
enjoy tentatively broad discretion in the choice of response to an internationally
unlawful act. Since there is no requirement that countermeasures take the same
form as the precipitating activity, cyber-countermeasures may be used in response
to non-cyber unlawful activity, and vice versa. Among these cyber-responses,
activities may vary widely, from more aggressive “hack back” operations against
the offending State, to more passive activities, such as the termination of packets
routed through the victim State.90 Yet some activity will likely fall beyond the
bounds of international law, such as the cyber equivalent of diverting a river,91 and
may be given a wide berth in turn.92
Adding upon this loose framework, the primary substantive limit on
countermeasures—proportionality—is weakened by the dearth of cyberexamples, the difficulty in categorizing cyber-operations, and the principle that
economically disproportionate countermeasures are allowable to enforce a
principle.93 While the classification of cyber-operations is still contested, and will
likely vary depending upon the specific context,94 both cyber-operations and cyber
due diligence could reasonably be interpreted as primarily “economic,” suggesting
that further laxity will be allowed when “enforcing a principle.” Considering the
host of principles that are contested in this area, for example, the legality of
economic espionage, this rule may defang the primary restriction imposed on
countermeasures. A State’s failure regarding due diligence may therefore give rise
to disproportionate countermeasures, and so long as those countermeasures are
not so disproportionate as to rise to a use of force,95 or to being “clearly
disproportionate,” there appears to be little in the way of constraining legal factors
on State cyber-countermeasures. However, the politics involved are another
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93
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One More Thing to Worry About, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 11, 11 (2011); Lotrionte, supra note 58,
at 520–21. Even in the seemingly slower realm of due diligence, this “urgent” provision
may still be utilized, as a State’s failure to police cybercrime perpetrated within its borders,
for example, could reasonably be interpreted as necessitating urgent countermeasures by
the victim State to quash the threat posed by the cybercriminals.
See Schmitt, supra note 78, at 704–705.
For a discussion of the economic and environmental impact of Slovakia’s actions, see
Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater
Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabickovo-Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 67, 102-106 (1995).
There is even some acknowledgment that countermeasures may negatively impact
innocent States, provided those impacts are not intentional and are minimized as much
as possible. See Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, supra note 76, at 1057.
See Air Services Agreement, supra note 87, at ¶ 83.
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 2, at 43–45.
See id.
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matter, as the Obama Administration’s consideration of breaching the Great
Firewall of China in response to the 2015 OPM breach illustrates.
Compounding this problem, States often are reluctant to formally
acknowledge cyber-operations at all. While often an extension of traditional
espionage, this unwillingness also likely stems in part from the legal ambiguity in
this area, particularly with regard to due diligence. Since the legality of economic
espionage and the requirements for cyber due diligence are not clearly delineated
under international law, the overt use of countermeasures is risky, as the
invocation of countermeasures does not shield the victim State if the precipitating
activity is later found lawful.96 Rather than rely purely on countermeasures and
risk international liability, States currently seem to employ a middle ground
between espionage and countermeasures, featuring a combination of public
outrage with private culpability that can be self-perpetuating, perhaps best seen in
the colloquy between the U.S. and China over economic espionage.97 Despite
some bilateral progress, this situation seems unlikely to be resolved in the near
future.98

C. Cybersecurity Due Diligence Obligations of Transit States
Cyber-attacks are frequently routed through several transit States before
reaching their ultimate targets so as to obfuscate the attack’s origin by taking
advantage of the distributed nature of the Internet’s architecture.99 As with attacks
launched from within a State, the obligations of States that retransmit malicious
Internet traffic originating elsewhere will likely depend upon that State’s
knowledge of the attack. The obligations of a State that knowingly allows a cyberattack to be transmitted through its domestic networks will likely be greater than
those that do so without knowledge. Among those States that transmit the attack
unwittingly, different standards could be applied to those that comply with
cybersecurity best practices and those that fail to do so.100 Furthermore, repeated
or continuous cyber-activity through a State’s domestic networks may give rise to
a presumption of knowledge, and direct use of State controlled critical
infrastructure could serve as evidence that the transit State knew or should have
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See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 79, art. 30 and accompanying commentary.
Jacob Davidson, China Accuses U.S. of Hypocrisy on Cyberattacks, TIME, (July 1, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/07/01/china-accuses-u-s-of-hypocrisy-on-cyberattacks/.
China Already Violating U.S. Cyberagreement, Group Says, CBS NEWS, (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/crowdstrike-china-violating-cyberagreement-uscyberespionage-intellectual-property/.
Mudrinich, supra note 38, at 198.
Heinegg, supra note 40, 136–37.
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known of a cyber-attack in progress.101 Yet State knowledge must be understood
in context, as the individual packets transmitted through the State’s network may,
taken alone, be innocuous.102 Cyber-attacks are complex and may be broken apart
into bits of seemingly innocuous or unintelligible code, only to be recognizable as
a cyber threat when reconstructed later. Stuxnet, for example, was designed in
such a way that it would only be activated on specific hardware and systems.103
This ease of obfuscation makes any cybersecurity obligation challenging both to
impose and to enforce, and the ultimate efficacy will likely be determined by the
standard of proof.
The due diligence duties that may be required of transit States would likely
reflect the role that a given State’s infrastructure played in the attack, which could
raise potentially disproportionate burdens on small, wired States. The highest level
of due diligence that could reasonably be required would be an affirmative
obligation to monitor a nation’s networks for cyber-attacks and to mitigate any
such threat. This would be akin to requirements of neutral States in time of war,
which are told to disallow and resist any belligerent force from transporting troops
or munitions through a neutral territory.104 Two potentially less onerous, yet more
likely, requirements would be a duty to warn target States of attacks detected on
their networks (without a hard requirement to monitor and eliminate), and a duty
to cooperate with cyber-forensics conducted by the target State to identify the
cyber-attack’s source.105 The transit State may still be under a general obligation to
enact and enforce domestic cybercrime legislation, as discussed above, although
this is unlikely to be relevant for mere transmission. Most broadly, the State may
be subject to a generalized duty to maintain a minimum standard of cybersecurity
care, as discussed above for the States in which the attack originated.
The role of transit States ultimately will reflect the degree to which their
actions and omissions contributed to the attack, and whether such actions were
voluntary or involuntary. While these obligations are certainly less demanding than
those of the State where the attack originated, transit States nonetheless may have
some obligations, and must consider the international implications of their
domestic cybersecurity strategies. However, it should be noted that as command
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Id.
Id. at 137–38.
See generally KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH OF
THE WORLD'S FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON passim (2014).
Convention Between the United States & Other Powers Respecting the Rights & Duties
of Neutral Powers & Persons in Case of War on Land, art. 5, 36 Stat 2310 (Oct. 18, 1907).
See Heinegg, supra note 40, at 140.
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and control servers move to targeted States, due diligence standards might shift.106
And regardless, there is a need to clarify the international law of neutrality to
determine whether victim States can hold neutral States accountable for cyber
attacks transited through their territory or for not being diligent in repelling
attackers.107

D. Caveats
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion elucidating customary
international obligations relating to cybersecurity generally, the unique nature of
cybersecurity raises problems potentially limiting or nullifying any presumptive
obligations. Apart from the legal cover provided by the law of espionage,
discussed above, cybersecurity has two major shortcomings that must be
considered when identifying international obligations: the geographic constraints
of the underlying cases, and the general exception for matters of national security.
The primary argument in response to any cyber-specific international
obligations is that the cases from which the duty to warn, the “no harm” principle,
and the non-intervention norm arose all predate cyberspace, and extension of
these rules to cybersecurity too greatly expands their scope of application. Both
Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter are arguably distinguishable on the grounds of
physical proximity. Corfu Channel involved a State’s obligations in their bordering
sovereign waters and addressed issues raised by ships of other nations physically
occupying those waters, while Trail Smelter involved environmental discharge
across a neighbor’s borders. Both cases recognize that actions undertaken by a
State within its own territory can have consequences beyond that territory, but are
nonetheless constrained to geographically proximate territories. This geographical
constraint is not reflected in the cybersecurity realm, where actions taken within
one’s borders can impact diverse networks and systems distributed across myriad
global networks. This substantial expansion of the territory on which harmful
activity may occur may be the slippery slope that derails this aspect of
cybersecurity due diligence requirements for States. After all, if the natural
environment were like cyberspace then many nations would be in breach of the
environmental obligations to one another through the emission of greenhouse
gases responsible for global climate change.108 As a result, perhaps this aspect of
international cybersecurity due diligence should be an arena of lex feranda that
106

107
108

Intel Security, Inc., Botnet Control Servers Span the Globe, MCAFEE LABS (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/botnet-control-servers-span-the-globe.
See Schmitt, supra note 78, at 727.
See Russell A. Miller, Surprising Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the Global Climate Change
Regime, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION 167, (Rebecca Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
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could lead to a change in attitudes within the international community.
International environmental obligations, although originally geographically
constrained, have increased in their scope of impact, with major environmental
catastrophes such as the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor and the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill showing that a single stakeholder’s environmental actions and omissions
can lead to global environmental challenges.109 As the world shrinks through
environmental and technological changes, geographic isolation, perhaps, should
no longer be a viable excuse for neglecting common “no harm” obligations.
Indeed, some commentators have already argued “that states have an obligation
of due diligence to prevent significant transboundary cyberharm to another state’s
intellectual property.”110
The second caveat to any cyber due diligence obligations is the exception for
national security under international law. Customary international law recognizes
four national security exceptions: change of circumstances, the law of reprisal,
self-defense, and the doctrine of necessity.111 Each of these exceptions recognizes
instances in which a State’s international obligations can be stayed due to the
actions or threat of action of another State. While narrow in scope, these
exceptions insert more uncertainty into an already uncertain arena, as none have
been clarified in the realm of cyber-activities, which often implicate issues of
national security. For instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
incorporating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), employs a
broad exception for “essential security interests,”112 which effectively serves as an
un-appealable, self-determined “get out of jail free card.” Despite the GATT’s
restriction on unilateral economic sanctions, the United States has on multiple
occasions used the national security exception to impose unilateral economic
sanctions, most recently against Russia.113 This exception for national security is a
109

110

111

112

113

See, for example, Steven Starr, Costs and Consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster,
PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psr.org/environment-andhealth/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-offukushima.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors as
Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275,
279 (2013) (“[A]ffected states may be entitled to reciprocate by . . . allowing their
victimized nationals to hackback.").
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 437, 443 (2008).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
See, for example, Robert Coalson, Explainer: How The International Sanctions Game Is Played,
RADIO FREE EUR. (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-us-sanctionsexplainer/25305528.html.
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frequently bemoaned aspect of international law, but nevertheless suggests a
fundamental valuation on the part of the international community that State
sovereignty is to be given preference on issues implicating essential security
interests. Therefore, any cybersecurity due diligence standards must be
understood to likely contain a national security exception, which could lead to the
exception swallowing the rule. Ultimately, the existence of these caveats and
exceptions makes any definitive statement regarding the status of international
due diligence standards that much more difficult. This state of affairs leads to the
necessity of examining public- and private-sector approaches to clarify the missing
elements to a cybersecurity due diligence norm.

III. N ATIONAL AND P RIVATE -S ECTOR A PPROACHES TO
C YBERSECURITY D UE D ILIGENCE
As discussed in the previous Section, international law, while informative,
does not dictate how nations should go about enhancing their cybersecurity to
account for emerging due diligence obligations. As a result, it is helpful to consider
established and proposed approaches in both the public and private sectors for
defining due diligence. Such national strategies could, in time, crystallize into
customary international law with enough state practice.114 Similarly, given the
extensive public-private cross-pollination of cybersecurity best practices, privatesector efforts aimed at enhancing cybersecurity are informative given the extent
to which they shape national policymaking with the NIST Framework being a case
in point.115 Thus, this final section begins by discussing several national case
studies of cybersecurity due diligence including the United States, Germany, and
China, as a first step to uncovering a due diligence governance spectrum. We then
offer a due diligence matrix to better inform the discussion before moving on to
examine the extent to which cybersecurity is entering the due diligence process of
mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. private-sector context. Finally, we conclude
with several observations for how industry cybersecurity norms are translating
into national policymaking, and what that means for managers, policymakers, and
the field of cybersecurity due diligence generally.

114

115

See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Assessment of Customary International
Law, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (2005), http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v1_rul_in_asofcuin.
Update on the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/
cyberframework/upload/nist-cybersecurity-framework-update-120514.pdf.
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This sub-section briefly reviews the national approaches of the United
States, Germany, and China with regards to cybersecurity due diligence regulation.
These case studies were chosen not only because these nations are among the
world’s leading cyber powers, but also to provide common and civil law, as well
as developed and emerging market perspectives on this issue. This analysis is not
meant to be dispositive, but rather to provide a snapshot for how this influential
subset of nations is approaching the topic of cybersecurity due diligence.116
Further research is required to determine whether the noted trends are playing out
globally.

1. The U.S.
The topic of cybersecurity due diligence per se has not received much
attention from the Obama Administration, though it is referenced in the 2011
International Strategy for Cyberspace. The Strategy advises that “States should
recognize and act on their responsibility to protect information infrastructures and
secure national systems from damage or misuse.”117 This conceptualization
represents an effort to crystallize a cybersecurity due diligence norm in
international law essential to broader efforts to promote cyber peace. Due to the
practical and political difficulties surrounding multilateral treaty development in
the cybersecurity arena, norm creation provides an opportunity to enhance global
cybersecurity without waiting for a comprehensive global agreement, which could
come too late if at all. Yet despite general agreement as to the value of
cybersecurity norms, including due diligence, “even simple norms face serious
opposition. Conflicting political agendas, covert military actions, espionage and
competition for global influence” have created a difficult context for cybersecurity
norm development and diffusion,118 a situation that the NSA revelations arguably
exacerbated. As a result, to be successful in such a difficult climate, norms must
be clear, universalized, and well-established.119 The U.S. has had some success in
applying international law to cyber warfare, along with extending human rights
116

117

118

119

See CYBER POWER INDEX, supra note 45, at 2–3 (discussing various indicators of cyber
power in the public and private sectors and making the case that the U.S., Australia, the
U.K., Germany, and Canada are the top five cyber powers).
WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY,
AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10 (2011).
James A. Lewis, Confidence-Building and International Agreement in Cybersecurity, in
DISARMAMENT FORUM: CONFRONTING CYBERCONFLICT 51, 58 (2011).
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52
INT’L ORG. 887, 906–907 (1998).
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protections online.120 But more broadly, what would a cybersecurity due diligence
norm look like from the national perspective? It is helpful to briefly review U.S.
approaches to this topic in order to provide and build out a framework for
discussion.
The U.S. has been active in strategizing about national cybersecurity since
the creation of the world’s first Cyber Emergency Response Team at Carnegie
Mellon University in 1988.121 Today, though, the field is crowded with agencies
and organizations responsible for various aspects of the nation’s cybersecurity.
The Department of Defense alone operates more than 15,000 networks in 4,000
installations spread across some 88 countries.122 Yet the majority of U.S. efforts in
this space have focused on securing vulnerable critical infrastructure (CI).
Although Congress has been active in this regard, successive administrations—
including those of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama—have pushed the ball
forward on securing vulnerable CI.123
Most recently, in 2009, President Obama declared the U.S. CI to be a
“strategic national asset,”124 though a fully integrated U.S. cybersecurity policy has
yet to be established.125 In the face of congressional inaction, President Obama
issued an executive order that, among other things, expanded public-private
120

121

122

123

124

125

Henry Farrell, Promoting Norms for Cyberspace, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (2015),
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358?cid=nlcnpbnews-2015_national_conference_confirmation_and_background--link2220150602&sp_mid=48790069&sp_rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnS0 (arguing that the
U.S. government should take the following three steps to reinvigorate a norms-based
approach to multilateral cybersecurity policymaking: “reform U.S. intelligence activities
to make them more consistent with the publicly expressed norms of Internet openness
that the United States is trying to establish; disclose more convincing evidence when
trying to shame actors that do not abide by cybersecurity norms; and encourage other
States and civil society actors to take a leading role in norm promotion—even when this
cuts against U.S. interests.”).
Cyber Emergency Response Team, About Us, https://www.cert.org/about/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2016).
Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp, Executive Summary, in AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7, supra note 48, at 12.
See Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (May 22, 1998), http://www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm; ERIC A. FISCHER, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS, CONG. RES.
SERV. at 2–4 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf.
Remarks by the President on Securing our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure, WHITE HOUSE (May 29,
2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-securing-ournations-cyber-infrastructure.
A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy Is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges,
GAO at 2 (May 7, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652817.pdf (“Further,
without an integrated strategy that includes key characteristics, the federal government
will be hindered in making further progress in addressing cybersecurity challenges.”).
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information sharing and established the NIST Framework, which included
private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to better secure CI.126
The NIST Framework is important since, even though its critics argue that it helps
solidify a reactive stance to the nation’s cybersecurity challenges,127 it is arguably
spurring the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in the U.S. that plays
into discussions of due diligence.128 In particular, the NIST Framework
harmonizes industry best practices to provide, its proponents argue, a flexible and
cost-effective approach to enhancing cybersecurity that assists owners and
operators of CI in assessing and managing cyber risk. Although the NIST
Framework is relatively new, some private-sector clients are already receiving
advice that if their “cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation
or a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due diligence’ was now the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework.”129 Over time, the NIST Framework has the potential
not only to shape a standard of care for domestic critical infrastructure
organizations but also to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for the
private sector writ large, given active NIST collaborations with a number of
nations, including the U.K., Japan, Korea, Estonia, Israel, and Germany.130

2. Germany.
Germany’s cybersecurity due diligence efforts rely on close collaboration
between the public and private sectors, nationally and globally.131 Known for its
126

127

128
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130

131

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY
CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminarycybersecurity-framework.pdf [hereinafter “NIST Framework”].
See Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed Reviews, CSO
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/security-leadership/nist-sfinalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html.
See, for example, Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Standard of Cybersecurity Care?:
Exploring the Implications of the 2014 Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and
International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. J. INT’L L. 287 (2015).
Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, INFO. SEC. BLOG (Feb. 25,
2014),
http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/nist-cybersecurity-frame
work.
Update on the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST at 4 (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/NIST-Cybersecurity-Frameworkupdate-073114.pdf. There is some evidence that this may already be happening with
regards to the Federal Trade Commission’s cybersecurity enforcement powers. See, for
example, Brian Fung, A Court Just Made it Easier for the Government to Sue Companies for Getting
Hacked, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-made-it-easier-for-the-government-to-suecompanies-for-getting-hacked/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_headlines.
CYBER-SICHERHEITSSTRATEGIE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND, GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF
THE INTERIOR 8–9 (2011), https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/
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strong national data protection law, with fines up to 300,000 Euros, Germany is
now moving to strict cybersecurity standards for CI and assigning the
responsibility to protect users and secure CI to service providers and operators of
CI.132 In particular, the federal government approved the German Cybersecurity
Strategy (Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland) in February 2011. The
Strategy recognizes cyberspace as an essential domain for the German State,
economy, and society, and emphasizes the protection of CI as a core cybersecurity
policy priority. Moreover, it addresses cybersecurity due diligence by recognizing
that “incidents in other countries’ information infrastructures may also indirectly
affect Germany.”133 The Strategy also calls for a code of conduct, international
legal harmonization and cooperation, and states that service providers may need
to assume greater responsibility for the security of their digital products and
users.134 In all, according to Booz Allen, Germany “is one of only five countries
(the others being the U.K., the U.S., France, and Japan) to have a comprehensive
national cyber plan and a comprehensive cybersecurity plan,” which has been “a
key to its success.”135
Germany has also been active in identifying and spreading cybersecurity best
practices in a manner similar to the NIST Framework. The Federal Office for
Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) first
released its IT Baseline Protection (IT-Grundschutz) in 1994.136 This set of BSI
standards contains recommendations for cybersecurity and has been adopted by
German corporations and international stakeholders. Some of the standards are
now available in English, Swedish, and Estonian.137 These standards are best
practice recommendations that have become “de facto standard[s] for [German]
IT security,” 138 but are not legally enforceable save for data protection fines
mentioned earlier.
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Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Informationsgesellschaft/cyber.pdf?__blob=publicationFi
le.
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN, SCHUTZ KRITISCHER INFRASTRUKTUREN – RISIKOUND KRISENMANAGEMENT: LEITFADEN FÜR UNTERNEHMEN UND BEHÖRDEN (2008),
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/2008/Leitfaden
_Schutz_kritischer_Infrastrukturen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 131, at 4.
Id. at 4–7.
CYBER POWER INDEX, supra note 45, at 3.
OWASP REVIEW BSI IT-GRUNDSCHUTZ BAUSTEIN WEBANWENDUNGEN,
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Review_BSI_IT-Grundschutz_Baustein_
Webanwendungen.
Id.
Id.
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Efforts are also underway in Germany’s private sector to widen the
discussion and dissemination of cybersecurity best practices. For example,
established in 2012, the Alliance for Cybersecurity (Allianz für Cybersicherheit) is
an initiative under the aegis of the Federal Office for Information Security.139 It
brings together more than a thousand public and private participating entities to
share best practices and further the cause of German cybersecurity due diligence.
The Alliance encourages voluntary reporting of cyber incidents and attacks to
collect information about current cyber threats against German organizations. 140
These private efforts help shape industry norms and contribute toward
responsible cyber behavior.
Germany’s Minister of the Interior, Dr. Thomas de Maizière, recently
addressed the topic of cybersecurity due diligence during the 2014 Global
Cyberspace Cooperation Summit in Berlin.141 Referring to the need to carefully
consider the principle of responsibility in cyberspace, de Maizière pointed to a
basic tenet in law: he who creates a risk for others is responsible for it. The greater
the risk, the larger the responsibility.142 Partly in response to this sentiment (and
to the 2013 NSA revelations), the German parliament adopted the IT Security Act
(Gesetzes zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme, or ITSicherheitsgesetz), which became effective July 25, 2015. The new law requires
companies to employ and comply with state-of-the-art technology to secure their
websites or be held liable in the event of a breach. More stringent security
requirements and responsibilities apply for CI operators. 143 The designated CI
sectors are responsible for developing appropriate security standards—similar to
the NIST Framework’s approach—pending the Ministry of the Interior’s
approval. CI operators are also obligated to inform the authorities of cyberattacks. These cybersecurity policy efforts are estimated to create between 200 and
425 new jobs across the federal government and cost for personnel and resources
of up to thirty-eight million Euros per year.144 However, relative to the U.S., where,
139

140
141

142
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See ALLIANZ FÜR CYBERSICHERHEIT, https://www.allianz-fuer-cybersicherheit.de/
ACS/DE/Home/startseite.html (last visited June 16, 2015).
Id.
Thomas de Maizière, Sichere Informationsinfrastrukturen in einem Cyber-Raum der Chancen und
der Freiheit (2014), http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/2014/12/eastwest-cyber-summit.html?nn=3314802.
Id. (“. . . wer ein Risiko für andere schafft, trägt dafür Verantwortung. Je größer das Risiko
ist, umso höher die Verantwortung”). This sentiment may also be considered another
manifestation of the sliding scale approach discussed above.
See Friendhelm Greis, Kabinett Beschließt Meldepflicht für Cyberangriffe, GOLEM.DE (2014),
http://www.golem.de/news/it-sicherheitsgesetz-regierung-beschliesst-meldepflichtfuer-cyberangriffe-1412-111234.html.
Id.
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despite an overall shrinking defense budget, cybersecurity spending continues to
increase—as is also the case with China—such costs seem reasonable.145

3. China.
According to Booz Allen, while the U.S. and Germany rank second and
fourth respectively in terms of their 2015 global cyber power ranking, China
comes in at—perhaps somewhat surprisingly—thirteenth place.146 Part of the
reason for this lower ranking is that China applies tight controls over its domestic
Internet in order to advance the Communist Party’s economic, political, and
military interests.147 Another factor is the desire to help secure its rule while having
a less robust legal and regulatory environment to enhance national cybersecurity. 148
On the international stage, China continues to seek cooperation “to promote the
building of a peaceful, secure, open, and cooperative cyberspace” and shape
international norms, particularly with regard to state sovereignty and censorship
under the guise of information security.149 At the same time, there are increasing
tensions between the U.S. and China about mutually-alleged cyber exploitations
including the millions of impacted current and former U.S. civil servants from the
Office of Personnel Management breach.150 In 2014, the U.S. indicted five hackers
of the People’s Liberation Army for economic cyber espionage; China protested
sharply.151 The U.S. government has billed China as the “world’s most active and

145

146
147

148
149

150
151

See, for example, Andrea Shalal & Alina Selyukh, Obama Seeks $14 Billion to Boost U.S.
Cybersecurity Defenses, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/02/02/us-usa-budget-cybersecurity-idUSKBN0L61WQ20150202.
See CYBER POWER INDEX, supra note 45, at 4.
Id. at 10; Edward Wong, For China, Cybersecurity Is Part of Strategy for Protecting the Communist
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/
for-china-cybersecurity-is-part-of-strategy-for-protecting-the-communist-party/.
Id.
See Sonya Sceats, China’s Cyber Diplomacy: a Taste of Law to Come?, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 14,
2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-cyber-diplomacy-a-taste-of-law-tocome/. China is pursuing cyber diplomacy on an array of fronts. Among other actions,
China is furthering the multilateral cybersecurity initiative with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, is negotiating a bilateral cybersecurity treaty with Russia, is involved in a
U.S.-China working group to diffuse tensions around mutually alleged cyber exploitations,
and has been drafting cybersecurity-relevant proposals and declarations to garner support
from like-minded States at the 2014 World Internet Conference in China and at various
U.N. meetings.
See Chappell, supra note 1.
See Weihua Chen, China Protests Against US Indictment, CHINA DAILY (May 20, 2014),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-05/20/content_17519650.htm.

30

Vol. 17 No. 1

Cybersecurity Due Diligence

Shackelford

persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”152 And in June 2013, President
Obama warned that the continuation of U.S. intellectual property theft is a serious
matter that will hinder further development of economic trade relations with
China. The U.S reaction may be conceived as an approach to shape cybersecurity
due diligence norms, by calling on China to take responsibility for alleged cyber
exploitations. Ultimately, though, such norms have a strong political dimension,
as the Chinese case study shows, and have not yet found a final form.
As with the U.S., China’s cybersecurity strategy is fragmented, but its
development and implementation has garnered the political support of senior
government officials. In early 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed that a
uniform and comprehensive approach to “network security” is necessary to turn
China into a “cyber power.”153 The speech coincided with the establishment of
the “Central Cyber Security and Informatization Leading Group,” which, under
the leadership of President Xi Jinping, will guide China’s cybersecurity policy
efforts.154
In many ways, China’s cybersecurity strategy is broader in scope than either
its U.S. or German counterparts.155 In addition to addressing the security of
networks and computers, it includes censorship of content and information
control to a far greater extent than is the case in these Western nations.156 It is the
Chinese government’s official position that “properly guiding Internet opinion is
a major measure for protecting Internet information security.”157 China’s take on
cybersecurity is reflected in the idea of Internet sovereignty.158 Cybersecurity plays
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DNI, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING
U.S. ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN
ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: 2009-2011 at i (Oct. 2011).
Xi Jinping: China Must Evolve From a Large Internet Nation to a Powerful Internet Nation,
XINHUANET (Feb. 27, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-02/27/c_
119538788.htm.
Id.
State Council, Opinion on Vigorously Promoting the Development of Informatization and Effective
Protection of Information Security (July 17, 2012), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/201207/17/content_2184979.htm.
See, for example, Hauke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: Internet Security, Protectionism
and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses, MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA STUD.,
5 (2015), http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/
150407_MERICS_China_Monitor_22_en.pdf; see also Shannon Tiezzi, China’s ‘Sovereign
Internet’, DIPLOMAT (June 24, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinassovereign-internet/.
Chris Buckley & Lucy Hornby, China Defends Censorship after Google Threat, REUTERS (Jan.
14, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-china-usa-google-idUSTRE
60C1TR20100114.
See, for example, Tiezzi, supra note 156.
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a crucial role in China’s endeavor to use the Internet as a means to build up a
domestic information economy and secure network infrastructure that benefits
domestic economic development and political stability.159
China’s first cybersecurity strategy dates back to 2003.160 It is referred to as
“Document 27: Opinions for Strengthening Information Security Assurance
Work” and covers—inter alia—CI protection.161 The current 2012 cybersecurity
strategy continues some of the earlier cybersecurity considerations (including CI
protection) while also addressing China’s dependency on foreign technology as a
security issue, the promotion of Chinese cryptography standards, the build-up of
broadband infrastructure, next-generation mobile technology, and e-government
services.162 Observers have criticized the document as an inconsistent “grab bag
of vague policy proposals.”163
Some of these measures are in line with cybersecurity due diligence efforts;
others are broader in scope and have raised concerns, particularly from U.S. and
European counterparts. For example, in 2007, China established a set of security
standards, the “Regulations on Classified Protection of Information Security,”
which are also referred to as the Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS), with the
objectives of safeguarding information and protecting national security. 164
Western firms and organizations repeatedly expressed disapproval since these
technical standards are incompatible with international IT security standards.165
Rather than protecting national security, these standards have been perceived as
protectionist measures that shield Chinese domestic IT firms from global
159
160

161
162
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165

Id.
Adam Segal, China Moves Forward on Cybersecurity Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July
24,
2012),
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/07/24/china-moves-forward-on-cyber
security-policy/.
Id.
Hauke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: New Political Leadership Focuses on Boosting
National Security, MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA STUD., 2 (2014), http://www.merics.org/
fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_20_eng.pdf. China
is far from alone, though, in seeking to protect its domestic industry in the name of
enhancing cybersecurity. See Karen Kornbluh, Beyond Borders: Fighting Data Protectionism,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/beyondborders-fighting-data-protectionism/p34008?cid=nlc-npbnews-2015_national_
conference_confirmation_and_background--link25-20150602&sp_mid=48790069&
sp_rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnS0; Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and
Create American Jobs, HUFF. POST (July 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scottj-shackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html.
Segal, supra note 160.
Nathaniel Ahrens, National Security and China’s Information Security Standards: Of Shoes,
Buttons, and Routers, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 1 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://csis.org/
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competition.166 Some argue that such efforts have actually resulted in less secure
Chinese standards and technology.167 For instance, leading cybersecurity
companies such as Kaspersky and Symantec are barred from competing in China’s
corporate market for financial institutions and power utilities.168 Such
developments may open the door for cyber attacks on China’s CI, a detriment to
the cause of cybersecurity due diligence.169
Similar to MLPS, and as part of its economic policy, China has attempted to
establish its own wireless network standard, WAPI.170 In reaction to NSA
revelations, China announced work on independent, Chinese operating systems
for desktop computers as well as mobile devices.171 Other recent or pending
Chinese legislation portends still more protection, such as requiring technology
companies that sell to China’s banks to submit their source code for government
inspection.172 A proposed draft for a new anti-terror legislation has been stalled,
but if implemented would similarly require companies to divulge encryption keys
and install backdoors to give Chinese authorities access to secured data and
communication.173 Such policies would impact Western tech firms in particular,
and could even bar them from China’s still-growing market.174
166
167
168
169

170

171

172

173

174

See, for example, id. at 15; see also Gierow, supra note 162, at 2.
See Gierow, supra note 162, at 7.
Id. at 5.
Once again, though, China is not alone in striking the appropriate balance between
promoting state sovereignty and digital protectionism and enhancing both cybersecurity
and innovation. The European Union is also in the midst of a similar debate with
behemoths of the Information Age including Google. See, for example, EU International
Cyberspace Policy, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, http://eeas.europa.eu/
policies/eu-cyber-security/index_en.htm (last visited June 16, 2015); David Fidler, Europe
v. Google: A Dispute About Competition, Political Power, and Sovereignty, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Apr. 21, 2015), http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/04/21/europe-v-google-adispute-about-competition-political-power-and-sovereignty/?cid=nlc-npbnews-2015_
national_conference_confirmation_and_background--link24-20150602&sp_mid=
48790069&sp_rid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZnIub3JnS0.
Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China’s Involvement in
High-Tech Standards Wars, ASIA POLICY, No. 2 41, 42 (July 2006).
Chinese OS Expected to Debut in October, XINHUANET (Aug. 24, 2014),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/24/c_133580158.htm.
Paul Mozur, New Rules in China Upset Western Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/in-china-new-cybersecurity-rulesperturb-western-tech-companies.html.
Krista Hughes, China puts tech bill that concerns West on hold: U.S. official, REUTERS (Mar. 13,
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-usa-idUSKBN0M91ZT2015
0313.
See Gierow, supra note 162, at 5; Shara Tibken, Apple’s Cook: Don’t Fret – China Growth
Remains Strong, CNET (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.cnet.com/news/apples-cook-sayschina-growth-remains-strong/.
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In summary, China expresses the need for the control of information and
exclusion of foreign-owned security technologies in order to protect its societal
stability. As a result, the Chinese strategy focuses on national security and
economic advancement. Elements of cybersecurity due diligence consequently
look quite different when compared to the U.S. or Germany, demonstrating the
difficulty of crafting a global norm in this space. However, one could potentially
construe a Chinese version of cybersecurity due diligence at the other end of the
spectrum that includes domestic economic rationales and protectionist measures
as opposed to a narrower focus on securing CI though a relatively well-developed
system of legal checks and balances. In fact, many of the policy objectives are
similar across the three case studies; what differs are the means.

4. Summary.
Custom requires widespread state practice that is undertaken out of a sense
of legal obligation. Depending on the type of norm involved, state practice needs
to be more or less widespread. For new norms, such as in the cybersecurity
context, the standard generally is “virtually uniform” state practice.175 This
threshold has not yet been reached in the cybersecurity due diligence context, as
illustrated by the three approaches explored above. The United States is more
voluntary, Germany takes a more regulatory approach featuring a comprehensive
cybersecurity policy that has long eluded U.S. policymakers, and China’s approach
encompasses broader economic and national security efforts. For a better sense
of how these nations vary in their treatment of cybersecurity due diligence, we
created a matrix comparing the three countries’ due diligence responsibilities.

5. Cyber Due Diligence Matrix.
Though there is not one consensus definition of cybersecurity due
diligence.176 For purposes of this matrix, we define it as an obligation under
international law that calls for a certain “form of conduct” from a state in order
to be in line with its international law obligations toward other States.177 While
public international law is particularly concerned with the relations among
States—as was revealed in the preceding three case studies—an international
cyber due diligence obligation implicates domestic actors and legislation. To fulfill
its international law obligations, a state arguably needs to be able to exercise
175
176
177

N. Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G.Den. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 41, 74 (Feb. 20).
Refer to the discussion in Section I(B).
Nicholas Tsagourias, Economic Cyber Espionage and Due Diligence, SYRACUSE UNIV.
CONTROLLING ECONOMIC CYBER ESPIONAGE’ WORKSHOP, 2 (June 18–19, 2015),
http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Tsagourias_Due_Diligence.pdf
(representing among the first efforts to undertake a comparative analysis of cybersecurity
due diligence).
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control over ICT and critical information infrastructure within the territory and
under its jurisdiction. Yet this is a difficult and complex undertaking given the
difficulties of jurisdiction, attribution, ambiguous norms, and nearly ubiquitous
private-sector ownership of critical infrastructure stemming from the wave of the
liberalization and privatization of public infrastructure beginning in the late
1970s.178 To further their cybersecurity due diligence mandates, States should,
among other steps, establish domestic policy regimes including laws, frameworks
(such as NIST and BSI), and initiatives that incentivize private actors under their
jurisdiction to behave in accordance with prevailing legal obligations. Table 1
proposes a non-comprehensive, working set of domestic “state responsibilities”
that contribute to fulfilling a state’s international law obligation on cyber due
diligence.179
The responsibilities in Table 1 fall into three general activity categories: (1)
Establish and Maintain, (2) Control and Enforce, and (3) Monitor and Assess.
Implementation of a given state’s responsibilities varies across state and
institutional settings. For instance, one state may legally mandate certain
technological standards whereas another state may choose a voluntary structure
for cybersecurity standards (such as the NIST Framework) or leave it to private
industry associations to establish such standards for particular business sectors.
The capacity among States to fulfill cyber due diligence as an international law
obligation varies.180 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the
U.N.’s intergovernmental telecommunications authority, was mandated to build
confidence and security in the use of ICTs.181 The ITU’s cyber mission includes a

178

179

180
181

See generally J.P. Singh, The Institutional Environment and Effects of Telecommunication Privatization
and Market Liberalization in Asia, 24 TELECOMM. POL’Y 885 (2000).
The cyber due diligence matrix in Table 1 reflects key aspects of a due diligence obligation
for cybersecurity as the authors perceive and define it. We gained analogical insights from
key cases of international due diligence obligations as described above in Section I, and
complemented those by looking for due diligence characteristics in three leading cyber
powers: the U.S., Germany, and China. This helped us to chart out comparative factors
applicable in the cyber domain. Nicholas Tsagourias’s cyber due diligence paper, the 2015
ITU Global Cybersecurity Index, and conversations at the 2015 workshop on
“Controlling Economic Cyber Espionage” at Syracuse University, June 18-19, were used
to help define and structure the cyber due diligence matrix. See Tsagourias, supra note 177;
ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX & CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES (2015),
https://www.itu.int/pub/D-STR-SECU-2015. However, this constitutes merely a first
effort, and we welcome any and all feedback on refining the matrix.
See Tsagourias, supra note 177, at 2.
The ITU’s cybersecurity mandate is based on the WSIS Action Line C5 on “Building
confidence and security in the use of ICTs”; Resolution 69 (WTDC-10) on “Creation of
national computer incident response teams”; Resolution 130 (PP-14) on “Strengthening
the role of ITU in building confidence and security in the use of information and
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particular focus on developing countries where the necessary capabilities to ensure
cyber due diligence may be lacking.182 Indeed, in early 2011, the ITU and U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding
to work together to help Member States fight cybercrime.183 Such efforts help to
establish a minimal shared standard that provides a lens through which
international law obligations regarding cyber due diligence may be interpreted.184
There is a need to establish clear notions about what domestic responsibilities a
state needs to live up to in order to meet the cyber due diligence requirement. Due
to technological and institutional development, however, those responsibilities are
subject to change and need to be adjusted accordingly. To describe and measure
a particular responsibility, we suggest adopting a maturity model, similar to that
used in software development.185 Such descriptive categories would allow one to
compare responsibility statuses across various States, an application of the notion
of common but differentiated responsibilities discussed further below.

182

183

184

185

communication technologies.” ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX, supra note 179, at
29-30.
See, for example, IMPACT: Mission & Vision, IMPACT, http:www.impactalliance.orgaboutusmission-&-vision.html (last visited June 30, 2013) (representing a
cross-cutting collaboration to assist developing nations in creating cyber emergency
response teams and creating/revising cybercrime laws).
UN Agencies Team Up to Make the Online World Safer: MoU Signed Between ITU and UNODC
at WSIS Forum 2011, ITU NEWSLOG: CYBERSECURITY SPAM AND CYBERCRIME (May 19,
2011), http:www.itu.intosgblogCategoryView,category,Cybersecurity%2BSpam%2
Band%2BCybercrime.asp.
Tsagourias argues for a need of a “common standard,” because otherwise private or
public actors may opt for operating from States with lesser developed cybersecurity
capabilities; this could put the concept of a cyber due diligence obligation under
international law at risk. See Tsagourias, supra note 177, at 6.
See Mark C. Paulk et al., Capability Maturity Model for Software (Carnegie Mellon Univ.
Working Paper, 1993), http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/93tr024.pdf.
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TABLE 1: STATE’S CYBER DUE DILIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES
State’s Responsibilities

U.S.

Establish and Maintain
- Define and implement strategies, frameworks and policies
for cybersecurity (for example, protection of critical
information infrastructure), and its governance, for the
state and private actors in its jurisdiction
- Introduce or adopt domestic laws and regulations relevant
to cybersecurity and cyber crime
- Establish and maintain capabilities to respond and react
to cyber incidents (for example, computer security incident
response team)

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

Germany

China

●186

●187

●188

●189

●190

●191

●192

●193

●194

See, for example, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, WHITE HOUSE (2008),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (summary); NIST
Framework, supra note 126.
See, for example, GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 131;
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIP STRATEGY),
GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (2009), http://www.bmi.bund.de/
cae/servlet/contentblob/598732/publicationFile/34423/kritis_englisch.pdf.
See, for example, China’s Current Cybersecurity Strategy, Opinion of the State Council Concerning
Forcefully Moving Informationization Development Forward and Realistically Guaranteeing Information
Security, GUANGMING WANG (2012), http://politics.gmw.cn/2012-07/17/content_
4571519.htm.
For the U.S., the 2015 Global Cybersecurity Index lists nineteen laws and regulations
related to cybercrime and cybersecurity. See ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX &
CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES, supra note 179, at 493.
For Germany, the 2015 Global Cybersecurity Index lists six laws and regulations related
to cybercrime and cybersecurity. See id., at 206.
For China, the 2015 Global Cybersecurity Index lists five laws and regulations related to
cybercrime and cybersecurity. See id., at 134. China’s National People’s Congress released
a first draft of its Network Security Law on July 6, 2015. 网络安全法 (草案) (Network
Security Law (Draft)), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2015-07/06/
content_1940614.htm.
See, for example, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2015); ICSCERT, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
See, for example, CERT-Bund, https://www.bsi.bund.de/CERT-Bund_en (last visited
Aug. 18, 2015).
See, for example, CNCERT, http://www.cert.org.cn (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
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State’s Responsibilities
- Define and implement technical standards, measures, and
best practices (for example, vulnerability patching) for
cybersecurity
- Define and maintain organizational processes and
mechanisms for cybersecurity

195

196

197

198
199

U.S.

Germany

China

●195

●196

●197

●198

●199

See, for example, NIST, http://www.nist.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2015); MITRE,
http://www.mitre.org (last visited Aug. 18, 2015).
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) defines the IT Baseline Protection (ITGrundschutz) standards and processes. See BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/
Topics/ITGrundschutz/itgrundschutz.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). The 2015 IT
Security Act requires government agencies and CI operators to meet minimal IT security
standards.
See
GESETZ
ZUR
ERHÖHUNNG
DER
SICHERHEIT
INFORMATIONSTECHNISCHER SYSTEME (IT-SICHERHEITSGESETZ) (July 17, 2015),
Bundesgesetzblatt 2015, I(31), Bonn, July 24, 2015 [hereinafter IT-SICHERHEITSGESETZ].
For instance, the Network and Information Security Standardization Technical
Committee of the China Communications Standards Association has issued numerous
technical IT security standards. See CCSA, http://www.ccsa.org.cn/english/
tc.php?tcid=is (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). The ITU Global Cybersecurity Index counted
eighteen standards that were approved by this committee in 2010. ITU, GLOBAL
CYBERSECURITY INDEX & CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES, supra note 179 at 134.
See, for example, NIST, supra note 195; MITRE, supra note 195.
See, for example, BSI, supra note 196. The 2015 IT Security Act requires CI operators to
notify the BSI about significant cyber incidents; in addition, telecom service providers are
required to inform their customers if they detect malicious traffic from their customers’
networks or computers such as botnets. See IT-SICHERHEITSGESETZ, supra note 196.
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State’s Responsibilities
- Provide training, education, and certification for
individuals and organizations
- Engage in collaboration on cybersecurity such as through
the Budapest Convention (for example, information
sharing, law enforcement, intelligence) with domestic and
international actors

200

201

202

203

204

205

U.S.

Germany

China

●200

●201

●202

●203

●204

●205

U.S. educational and training efforts include, for instance, the National Cyber Security
Awareness Month, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICCS), and the
designation of academic institutions as National Centers of Academic Excellence in
Information Assurance (IA)/Cyber Defense (CD) in education and research. See, for
example, STAYSAFEONLINE.ORG, https://www.staysafeonline.org/ncsam/ (last visited
Aug. 18, 2015).
The BSI, for instance, certifies individuals, service providers, systems, services, and
products with regard to IT security and assurance. See ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND
KONFORMITÄTSBEWERTUNG, FEDERAL OFFICE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/ZertifizierungundAnerkennung/zertifizierung
undanerkennung_node.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). Germany has no federal
authority charged with educational or professional training for cybersecurity and related
public awareness that we could uncover. See ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX &
CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES, supra note 179, at 207.
For instance, the July 2015 draft of China’s Network Security Law addressed cyber
education and training in articles 15, 16, and 28. See, 网络安全法 (草案) (Network
Security Law (Draft)), supra note 191, at 202, art. XV-XVI, XXVIII.
The U.S. ratified the Budapest Convention and emphasized the importance of
international collaboration in its 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace. See WHITE
HOUSE, supra note 117. DHS, for instance, has international sharing agreements with
India and Israel. Andreas Kuehn & Milton Mueller, Einstein on the Breach: Surveillance
Technology, Cybersecurity and Organizational Change, in SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE:
TARGETING NATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURES, INDIVIDUALS 127, 142 (Giampiero
Giacomello ed., 2014). Domestically, the 2015 Executive Order on Promoting Private
Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing encourages information sharing and analysis
organizations. See Executive Order Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurityinformation-sharing.
See ALLIANZ FÜR CYBERSICHERHEIT, supra note 139. Internationally, Germany
cooperates with the U.S. on cybersecurity through a joint cyber bilateral mechanism. See
Joint Statement on U.S.-Germany Cyber Bilateral Meeting, U.S. DEP’T ST. (June 27, 2014),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/228543.htm.
According to the 2015 Global Cybersecurity Index, cooperation and information sharing
is established on the national level within the public sector. In addition, there is “massive
cooperation” among China’s telecom operators, the China Internet Network Information
Center, and CNCERT. See ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX & CYBERWELLNESS
PROFILES, supra note 179, at 135.

Summer 2016

39

Chicago Journal of International Law
State’s Responsibilities
Control and Enforce
- Hold ownership or exercise regulatory control over critical
infrastructure
- Conduct review and control of information technology
deployed in critical infrastructure

206

207

208

209

210

U.S.

Germany

China

●206

●207

●208

●209

●210

For instance, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission adopted critical
infrastructure protection standards. See Peter Behr, A Decade After the Northeast Blackout,
Reliability Increases but Human Issues Persist, E&E (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059985876/print. While the 2014 NIST Framework
does not establish additional regulatory requirements, utilities and operators of CI may
find it hard to avoid implementation. See Stephen M. Spina & J. Daniel Skees, Electric
Utilities and the Cybersecurity Executive Order: Anticipating the Next Year, 26 ELECTRICITY J.
61, 65 (2013).
The 2015 IT Security Act addressed IT security requirements for CI. See ITSICHERHEITSGESETZ, supra note 196.
It is generally understood that China’s government holds more direct control over CI
than its Western counterparts. In the telecom sector, for instance, the major operators are
state-owned; in addition, there are limitations on foreign investments, and thus foreign
ownership and control are limited. See Yukyung Yeo, Between Owner and Regulator: Governing
the Business of China’s Telecommunications Service Industry, 2009 CHINA Q. 1013, 1016 (2009).
On July 1, 2015 China adopted a new National Security Law that reinforced Chinese
authorities’ ability to maintain security in all fields, including cyber; it mandates national
security reviews for foreign investments in Internet technologies and ICT. See, for example,
Edward Wong, China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/asia/china-approvessweeping-security-law-bolstering-communist-rule.html. Timothy P. Stratford et al, China’s
New National Security Law, NAT’L L. REV. BLOG (July 7, 2015),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-s-new-national-security-law.
In 2012, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee warned U.S. telecom operators not to
buy network equipment from Chinese equipment manufacturers ZTE and Huawei. Since
2013, certain U.S. federal departments and agencies have required governmental approval
before sourcing information technology from Chinese companies. See, for example, Megha
Rajagopalan, China “Resolutely Opposes” U.S. Curbs on IT Imports: State Media, REUTERS (Mar.
3, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/30/us-china-us-trade-idUSBRE
92T01J20130330.
See, for example, NATHANIEL AHRENS, NATIONAL SECURITY AND CHINA’S INFORMATION
SECURITY STANDARDS: OF SHOES, BUTTONS, AND ROUTERS (2012), http://csis.org/
publication/national-security-and-chinas-information-security-standards.
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State’s Responsibilities

U.S.

Germany

China

- Enforce compliance with regulations and policies
Monitor and Assess
- Monitor and assess cyber risks and threats landscape
- Monitor and evaluate technological developments
- Monitor and assess state’s overall cybersecurity efforts
across all domains; adjust and enforce where necessary

●211

●212

●213

●214
●216

●215

●217

Table 1 includes areas of domestic responsibilities that we analyzed in the
case studies of the U.S., Germany, and China. The objective of this Article,
however, is not to provide a comprehensive comparative reckoning, but rather to
211

212

213

214

215

216

217

The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. However, the U.S.
has implemented various regulations and acts of legislation that target cybersecurity and
cybercrime. See ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX & CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES,
supra note 179, at 493.
The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. Germany has
implemented various regulations and acts of legislation that target cybersecurity and
cybercrime. See id., at 206.
The authors are not aware of any systematic study that addresses the compliance and
degree of enforcement with domestic cyber regulations and policies. China has
implemented various regulations and acts of legislation that target cybersecurity and
cybercrime. See id., at 134.
The US-CERT provides threat information through its National Cyber Awareness
System. See National Cyber Awareness System, US-CERT, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas
(last visited Aug. 18, 2015). The U.S. intelligence community addresses cyber threats in
its annual Worldwide Threat Assessment. See, for example, James R. Clapper, Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, DNI (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL
.pdf.
The BSI issues an annual report on the state of cybersecurity that addresses cyber risks
and threats. See, for example, Die Lage Der It-Sicherheit In Deutschland 2014, BSI (Dec.15,
2014),
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/
Lageberichte/Lagebericht2014.html. The 2015 IT Security Act requires CI operators to
provide regular proof of compliance regarding IT security requirements in form of audits,
evaluation, or certification. See IT-SICHERHEITSGESETZ, supra note 196.
Various U.S. federal entities, including the National Institute of Standards and
Technology and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, assess
technological development with resources dedicated on cyber.
While authorities and responsibilities with regard to cyber are allocated across numerous
U.S. federal agencies, the U.S. Cybersecurity Coordinator at the White House occupies a
central function in coordinating U.S. cybersecurity policies and activities. See Michael
Daniel, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/author/michael-daniel (last visited Aug. 18,
2015).
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provide illustrative examples of various domestic responsibilities and approaches
to meeting them in the due diligence context. The proposed list of domestic
responsibilities requires testing and revision to determine its utility in meeting
international law obligations. Given the variety of institutional and jurisdictional
settings across States, it is likely that various combinations of domestic
responsibilities and their different implementations may satisfy a cybersecurity due
diligence obligation under international law.218 Yet, aside from national case
studies, there are also valuable lessons from the private sector that could inform
the eventual shape of a cybersecurity due diligence norm, which we turn to next.

B. Lessons from the Private Sector
Among the criticisms of the NIST Framework is that, although it does a
good job at promoting general “cyber hygiene” for those organizations that
implement it, it is less well suited to protecting firms from sophisticated and
targeted cyber attacks sometimes called Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).
Indeed, there is a cybersecurity due diligence industry emerging in which the NIST
Framework, and for that matter the German BSI Standards, play a role but are
only one aspect of a larger decision-making process that companies contemplating
all sorts of business decisions from mergers and acquisitions to supply-chain
management must consider.219 This section investigates some hallmarks of this
trend, primarily in the U.S. mergers and acquisitions context.
U.S. law helps to inform a host of legal questions faced by the private sector
as part of an overarching cybersecurity due diligence process,220 though legal
requirements do vary in large part by industry sector.221 It is critical for companies,
for example, to have detailed cybersecurity strategies in place on what employee
218

219

220

221

See ITU, GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX & CYBERWELLNESS PROFILES, supra note 179
(including some level of detail on legal, organizational, and technical measures, as well as
capacity building and cooperation from ITU nations that can be construed as emerging
norms relevant to cyber due diligence).
See, for example, GREGORY J. TOUHILL & JOSEPH TOUHILL, CYBERSECURITY FOR
EXECUTIVES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 123 (2014).
See Jamie Barnett et al., Cybersecurity Issues in Dealmaking: What You Need to Know, ACG at 7
(2014), http://www.acg.org/UserFiles/file/Cybersecurity%20Webinar%20-Final.pdf.
What is Critical Infrastructure?, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure (last
visited Jan. 16, 2014). See What is the ICS-CERT Mission?, http://ics-cert.uscert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (The U.S. Cyber
Emergency Response Team, which is part of DHS, identifies sixteen critical infrastructure
sectors consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, including: agriculture,
banking and finance, chemical, commercial facilities, dams, defense industrial base,
drinking water and water treatment systems, emergency systems, energy, government
facilities, information technology, nuclear systems, public health and healthcare,
telecommunications, and transportation systems.).

42

Vol. 17 No. 1

Cybersecurity Due Diligence

Shackelford

and customer data has been retained and used and how that data is secured. If
unsatisfactorily undertaken, potential resulting causes of action include negligence,
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy, to name a
few.222 This can lead to the ousting of managers up to and including the C-suite as
in the aftermath of the Target and Sony cyber attacks, but still many organizations
have not taken the necessary steps to internalize cybersecurity due diligence. For
example, roughly two-thirds of surveyed companies use encryption for data in
transit,223 but only about half use intrusion prevention systems and encryption for
data in storage.224 Still fewer, approximately one-third, use public-key encryption,
specialized wireless security systems, or content-monitoring systems to prevent
data loss.225 Even more dramatic, just thirteen percent of respondents to a 2012
PwC survey made the survey’s “leader cut,” a label used to identify respondents
that measured and reviewed their cybersecurity policies annually, had “an overall
information security strategy in place,” analyzed the types of cyber attacks hitting
their networks, and had a CISO or equivalent reporting to “the top of the
house.”226 Those organizations that made the cut reported half as many incidents
as those that did not.227 Yet, some progress is being made; by 2014, PwC found
that while sixty-nine percent of surveyed U.S. executives were “worried that cyber
threats will impact growth,” overall awareness as to the importance of
cybersecurity is increasing, as illustrated by the rise in cyber information sharing.228
One arena with application to due diligence showing increasing promise is mergers
and acquisitions.229
Jason Weinstein, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the U.S.
Department of Justice, summarized the issue of cybersecurity due diligence
succinctly when he said: “When you buy a company, you’re buying their data, and

222
223

224
225
226

227
228

229

See, for example, Barnett et al., supra note 220, at 12.
Robert Richardson, CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey, CSI 19 (2008),
http:i.cmpnet.comv2.gocsi.compdfCSIsurvey2008.pdf; Verizon, Data Breach
Investigations Report 63 (2012), http:www.verizonbusiness.comresourcesreports
rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf [hereinafter “DBIR”].
Id. at 19.
See id. at 19.
See Eye of the Storm: Key Findings from the 2012 Global State of Information Security Survey, PWC
33 (2012), http://www.pwc.co.nz/global-state-of-information-survey.aspx.
Id.
See US Cybercrime: Rising Risks, Reduced Readiness: Key Findings from the 2014 US State of
Cybercrime Survey, PWC 6 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness
/publications/assets/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf.
See TOUHILL & TOUHILL, supra note 219, at 209 (“[D]ue diligence refers to your activities
to identify and understand the risks facing your organization.”).
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you could be buying their data-security problems.”230 In other words, “[c]yber risk
should be considered right along with financial and legal due diligence
considerations.”231 Already a majority of respondents in one 2014 survey reported
that cybersecurity challenges are altering the M&A landscape, while eighty-two
percent said that cyber risk would become more predominant over the following
eighteen months.232 A majority of surveyed firms also said that a cyber-attack
during the M&A negotiation process could scuttle the deal, which is a concern
given the range of serious cyber-attacks coming to light on a regular basis in an
era of increasing mergers.233 Managers now considering what form cybersecurity
due diligence should take have a wealth of resources (as well as a growing array of
compliance obligations)234 to consider. These include, in the U.S. context, the
NIST Framework, as well as guidance from the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the PCI
Security Standards Council.235 Together, these frameworks, and others, provide
the beginnings of a cybersecurity due diligence standard guiding judges as they
work through causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty and negligence
resulting from data breaches.236 The same goes for partnerships with vendors. The
Target breach, for example, which exposed some forty million credit card
numbers, was the result of lax security from a heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) vendor that for some reason had access to myriad Target
systems well beyond HVAC networks.237
Despite some progress, there is still a long way to go to enhance privatesector cybersecurity due diligence, including in the M&A context. Freshfields
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Id.
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See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (finding that to establish a failure of
oversight, a shareholder must plead and prove that: “(a) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented
such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention”).
See Ayres, supra note 231.
Cf. Willingham v. Global Payment, 2013 WL 440702, at *19 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013)
(reflecting an alternative view in which courts are reluctant to rely on data security
standards as a means of determining whether a duty was owed, let alone whether they
should be used to determine a reasonable standard of care).
See Target Hackers Broke in via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SEC. (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/.
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Bruckhaus Deringer, a global law firm, for example, conducted a survey in which
they found that:
78 per cent of global respondents believe cyber security is not [analyzed] in
great depth or specifically quantified as part of the M&A due diligence
process, despite 83 per cent saying they believe a deal could be abandoned if
previous breaches were identified and 90 per cent saying such breaches could
reduce the value of the deal.238

Similarly, only thirty-nine percent of respondents “say they make cyber
security policies… a condition precedent that is addressed prior to completion”
of a transaction.239 In other words, despite growing recognition as to the scale and
scope of the multifaceted cyber threat facing firms, many remain predominantly
reactive.240 In order to improve the status quo, firms must leverage the above
cybersecurity best practices among many others, ranging from utilizing risk-based
data management to minimizing the danger of insider threats through meshing
corporate and human resources policies and reviewing the cybersecurity track
records of vendors and potential partners.241 Still, that might not be enough.
The end result is a push among IT professionals to go beyond mere due
diligence and move toward the use of real-time analytics and other cybersecurity
best practices to monitor vendors’ systems.242 The lesson here is constant
vigilance; that is, letting an initial process of cybersecurity due diligence be the
first—and not the last—word in an ongoing proactive and comprehensive
cybersecurity policy that promotes cyber hygiene along with the best practices
essential for battling APTs.243 Such a policy should be widely disseminated and
regularly vetted as part of an overarching enterprise risk management process,
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along with having an incident response plan in place that includes private and
public information sharing mechanisms.244

C. A Polycentric Approach to Promoting Due Diligence and
Cyber Peace
The above private-sector best practices should inform national and, indeed,
international debates playing out in the field of cybersecurity due diligence.
Together, such bottom-up experimentation could be considered a polycentric
approach to unpacking the field of cybersecurity due diligence. This multi-level,
multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectoral model,245 championed by
scholars including Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom,
challenges orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits of self-organization,
networking regulations “at multiple scales”246 and examining the extent to which
national and private control can in some cases coexist with communal
management as illustrated in the success of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IEFT).247 It also posits that, due to the existence of free riders in a multipolar
world, “a single governmental unit” is often incapable of managing “global
collective action problems”248 such as cyber attacks. Instead, a polycentric
approach recognizes that diverse organizations working at multiple levels can
create different types of policies that can increase levels of cooperation and
compliance, enhancing “flexibility across issues and adaptability over time.” 249
244
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247
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For more on this topic, see Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative
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note 228, at 7 (noting that the best policy among those studied to help detect and deter
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management).
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Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011) (defining
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Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series No. 08–
6,
2008),
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Ostrom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1.
See Shackelford, supra note 6 at 1326-1333.
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Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/
pe/2009/04268.pdf.
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Such an approach, in other words, recognizes both the common but differentiated
responsibilities of public- and private-sector stakeholders as well as the potential
for best practices to be identified and spread organically, generating positive
network effects that could, in time, result in the emergence of a cascade toward a
cybersecurity due diligence norm.250 In this way, a polycentric method to enhance
cybersecurity due diligence would leverage the expertise of industry councils,
open-source collaboration, and state practice in the same way that IETF working
groups have successfully managed the communications aspects of Internet
governance.251 Such a norm should not only focus on the cyber hygiene referenced
in the NIST Framework but should also encourage the uptake of proactive
cybersecurity best practices so as to secure our networks along with clarifying the
rights and responsibilities of transit States to help foster cyber peace.
As applied to cybersecurity due diligence, the field of polycentric governance
has an array of more particularized lessons drawn from Professor Ostrom’s work
summarized in her Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework. This is a
Framework of governance best practice gleaned from decades of commons field
studies and applied, among other contexts, to global commons issues including
atmospheric governance.252 Some of these principles similarly have resonance to
the cause of cybersecurity due diligence, including the need to undertake effective
cost-benefit analyses,253 conduct supply chain monitoring with an eye toward
spotting hardware and software vulnerabilities, and institute governance strategies
that permit ample space for innovation while still mandating proven best
practices.254 The latter goal may be furthered by, for example, requiring NIST
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legitimacy of polycentric regimes, and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory regimes are polycentric
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APPROACHES IN SOCIOLOGY IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS(EOLSS),
Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO (C. Crothers ed., 2010),
http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c04/e6-99a-34.pdf.
Cost-benefit analysis in the cybersecurity context is challenging both because of the
difficulty in defining all the associated costs of a successful data breach as well as
determining an investment strategy to identify and instill technological, budgetary, and
organizational best practices. See, for example, TOUHILL & TOUHILL, supra note 219, at 30–
31; SHACKELFORD, Risky Business: Enhancing Private-Sector Cybersecurity, in MANAGING
CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF
CYBER PEACE 197, 212–15, 224–230, supra note 21.
See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of
Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL
CHALLENGES IN BUILDING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 105, 118 tbl. 5.3 (Eric
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Framework compliance for all suppliers and potential partners, something that
more firms are undertaking. For example, in early 2015, Bank of America
announced “that it is using the Framework and will also require it of its vendors,”
while QVC similarly publicized “that it is using the Cybersecurity Framework in
its risk management.”255
Such innovative efforts are critical to furthering the cause of cyber peace,
especially when coupled with effective cybersecurity regulation as discussed in the
German case study. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a U.N.
agency specializing in information and communication technologies, pioneered
some of the early work in the field by defining “cyber peace” in part as “a
universal order of cyberspace” built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the
absence of disorder or disturbance and violence.”256 Although certainly desirable,
such an outcome is politically and technically unlikely, at least in the near term. 257
That is why cyber peace is not defined here as the absence of conflict, a state of
affairs that may be called negative cyber peace.258 Rather, it is the construction of
a network of multilevel regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable
cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries alike
to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime, and espionage to levels
comparable to other business and national security risks. To achieve this goal, a
new approach to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the
public and private sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence. Working
together through polycentric partnerships, we can mitigate the risk of cyber war
by laying the groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human rights,
spreads Internet access along with best practices, and strengthens governance
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mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration.259 Already, some of the
public- and private-sector efforts highlighted in this paper may be bearing fruit
with, by some estimates, the severity of cyber-attacks beginning to plateau and a
“norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics” emerging.260

IV. C ONCLUSION
The field of international cybersecurity due diligence remains a complex,
demanding, and difficult arena that requires sustained academic, private, and
public engagement if progress is to be made. Myriad alternative paths forward
beckon. For example, States could exercise due diligence through passive means,
promoting resiliency in domestic and partner nations’ networks.261 Warning
systems for various types of cyber-attacks facilitated by cyber emergency response
teams, active (and two-way) private-sector information sharing and collaboration
on identifying and spreading cybersecurity best practices, and a robust cyber
hygiene campaign may be considered other essential elements of cybersecurity due
diligence. Other best practices include partitioning access to code and systems,
audits and regular penetration testing, and promoting redundancy and parallel
network construction to build further resiliency, as well as harnessing
cybersecurity expertise beyond one’s own organizational boundaries through bug
bounty and vulnerability reward programs.262 The NIST Framework and the
259
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related standards it references provide a conceptual toolbox to identify gaps in an
organization’s cybersecurity readiness of which both public and private sector
actors should be aware, along with the German BSI Standards and Chinese
equivalents. There is plenty of low-hanging fruit. After all, the Australian
government has reportedly been succcessful in preventing eighty-five percent of
cyber attacks through following three common sense techniques: application
whitelisting (only permitting pre-approved programs to operate on networks),
regularly patching applications and operating systems, and “minimizing the
number of people on a network who have ‘administrator’ privileges.”263
Over time, as legal harmonization progresses, there will be increasing
opportunities to build out cybersecurity norms, including those surrounding the
question of due diligence. Already, a number of national governments, and even
some companies such as Microsoft, have released lists of draft norms for
stakeholder consideration.264 Given both the rich cross-pollination of
cybersecurity best practices and the cyber threat posed by a huge range of attackers
to the public and private sectors, conceptions of cybersecurity due diligence
should be gleaned from existing customary international law but built out through
a review of industry norms that are in turn informing national policies. Achieving
some measure of cyber peace requires the active involvement of public- and
private-sector stakeholders. It may be time for more international lawyers to reach
out to CISOs, and vice versa.
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